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τὰ γὰρ σύμβολα τούτων, ὧν ἐστι 
σύμβολα, μιμήματα οὐκ ἔστιν.
Procl. In rem I 198, 15–16
οἱ μῦθοι τὰ πολλὰ διὰ τῶν συμβόλων 
εἰώθασι τὰ πράγματα ἐνδείκνυσθαι. 
Procl. In Tim. I 30, 14–15
Proclus’ account of symbol and poetry has for a long time been recognized as highly 
original and profoundly influential.1 While the philosopher’s hermeneutical insights have 
1  Thus, for example, Cardullo (1985: 20) stresses that “la dottrina del simbolo in Proclo, assume – nelle sue 
forme piú mature – delle caratteristiche tali da renderla estremamente originale e «suggestiva» di fecondi appro-
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received substantial scholarly attention, the present paper will briefly consider Proclus’ 
fascinating views on the symbolic function of poetry, the pedagogic as well as the hieratic 
value of myths and the salvational role of allegorical interpretation.2 The article will be 
organized in the following way: firstly, Plato’s onslaught on mimetic art will be touched 
upon; then, attention will be paid to the major assumptions of Proclus’ hermeneutics, 
subsequently, Proclus’ theory of three kinds of poetry will be discussed, upon which his 
account of the difference between the myths of Homer and those of Plato will be dealt 
with; finally, Proclus’ conviction about the soteriological power of allegoresis will be 
examined. The ensuing considerations will focus primarily on Proclus’ Commentary on 
the Republic.3
Plato’s dismissal of poetry as μέγιστον ψεῦδος
Proclus develops his original theory of symbolic poetry in direct response to Plato’s 
unsparing criticism of mimetic art. Whilst Plato argues that that poetic mime-
sis has no value whatsoever, the philosopher levels two fundamental charges (Resp. 
603 a 11–b 2) against it: imitative art is far from (πόρρω) all truth (ἀληθείας) and all 
reason (φρονήσεως). These accusations reflect Plato’s epistemological and ethical 
concerns, respectively. 
Plato perceives (Tim. 39 d 8–e 2) the world of phenomena as merely an “imitation of 
the everlasting nature” (τῆς διαιωνίας μίμησις φύσεως). Thus, by describing the sensi-
ble world, the poets reach solely the secondary reflections of the true reality (i.e., the 
intelligible world). Their mimetic art produces, thereby, exclusively false appearances, 
as it fabricates copies of the copies. It is for that reason that Plato repeatedly insists that 
deceptive phantoms (εἴδωλα) are the only thing that imitative poetry has to offer (cf. e.g. 
Resp. 598 b 6–8, 599 a 7, 599 d 3, 600 e 4–6, 601 b 9–10, 605 b 7–c 4). As mimetic poetry 
conjures up barely illusions, it has to be exiled from the ideal state. 
Yet, there is another reason for the banishment of poetry. False and deceptive as the 
poets’ phantasms are, they, nonetheless, exert a powerful impact on the minds of people. 
Plato famously differentiates between intellect (νοῦς) and opinion (δόξα). According to 
the philosopher (Tim. 51 e 2–6), the former results from teaching, is always supported 
by a true reasoning, remains impervious to persuasion and is, therefore, ascribed to the 
fondimenti teorici e storiografici per lo studioso del pensiero neoplatonico”. In a somewhat similar vein, Struck 
(2004: 238–239) hails Proclus as the author of “the first surviving systematically formulated alternative to the 
notion that literature is an imitation of the world”. For a discussion of Proclus’ impact on later theories of symbol 
and poetry, see e.g. Struck (2004: 254–277 and 2010: 69–70); cf. also the collection of essays in Gersh (2014).
2  In my understanding of Proclus’ hermeneutics, I am greatly indebted to the following works: Gallavot-
ti (1933); Friedl (1936); Buffière (1956); Coulter (1976); Dillon (1976); Sheppard (1980), Cardullo (1985); 
Lamberton (1986); Brisson (1996); van den Berg (2001); Struck (2004); Pichler (2006) and Chlup (2012).
3  The text is from Proclus, In Platonis rem publicam commentarii, ed. W. Kroll, 2 vols. Leipzig, 1899–1901. 
Where no English reference is provided, the translation is my own.
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gods and only to very few individuals; the latter, on the other hand, arises from persua-
sion, is contrary to reason, remains open to persuasion, upon which it is attributed to 
every man. The aforementioned dichotomy underlies Plato’s notorious diagnosis (Resp. 
607 b 5–6) that there is “an ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry” (παλαιὰ 
μέν τις διαφορὰ φιλοσοφίᾳ τε καὶ ποιητικῇ). The feud between philosophy and poetry 
is due to the fact that the latter appeals to our emotions rather than to reason. Thus, Plato 
recognizes (601 b 1) that “a certain great charm” (μεγάλη τὶς κήλησις) is characteristic 
of all poetry, upon which he makes it clear (605 b 3–5) that the mimetic poet invari-
ably “stirs up, fosters and strengthens this part of the soul that destroys the rational part” 
(τοῦτο ἐγείρει τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τρέφει καὶ ἰσχυρὸν ποιῶν ἀπόλλυσι τὸ λογιστικόν). As the 
poet kowtows, then, to the unintelligent component of the soul, his art demoralizes and 
depraves men. 
Hence, the deceptive and irrational nature of poetic mimesis compels Plato to dismiss 
(Resp. 377 e 6–7) the myths of Homer and Hesiod as “the greatest lie” (τὸ μέγιστον […] 
ψεῦδος). When rejecting the myths of the poets, Plato repudiates not only the literal 
sense of these narratives but also any attempts at interpreting them allegorically. When 
denouncing such myths as the binding of Hera, the hurling of Hephaestus and all “such 
battles of the gods” (θεομαχίας ὅσας), Plato puts it in no uncertain terms (Resp. 378 d 3–8) 
that such tales “must not be admitted into the State” (οὐ παραδεκτέον εἰς τὴν πόλιν), 
regardless of “whether they have any hidden meanings or not” (οὔτ’ ἐν ὑπονοίαις 
πεποιημένας οὔτε ἄνευ ὑπονοιῶν), since “a young person cannot judge what is an alle-
gorical sense and what is not” (νέος οὐχ οἷός τε κρίνειν ὅτι τε ὑπόνοια καὶ ὃ μή).4 Plato’s 
repudiation of allegoresis is a consequence of his rejection of poetry: given the deceptive 
and irrational nature of poetic mimesis, any reading of the poets (whether allegorical or 
literal) is bound to be misguided.5
Proclus’ dilemma: μέγιστον ψεῦδος or ἔνθεος ποίησις?
Plato’s repudiation of poetry is hardly palatable for Proclus, who takes the poetry of 
Homer to be neither delusive nor demoralizing, but rather divinely inspired (cf. e.g. 
4  Plato’s criticism of allegoresis suggests that the practice must have become quite common before his time, 
cf. e.g. Wehrli (1928: 89); Tate (1929: 143); Buffière (1956: 124); Lamberton (1986: ix) and Struck (2004: 49). 
While Plato is evidently familiar with the various allegorical interpretations of the myths he alludes to, the philos-
opher firmly repudiates the idea of extracting any latent sense from them. For illuminating discussions of the 
connection between the earlier term ὑπόνοια and its later equivalent ἀλληγορία, see e.g. Buffière (1956: 45–48); 
Pépin (1976: 85–92); Whitman (1987: 263–268) and Blönnigen (1992: 11–19). Cf. infra, n. 34.
5  With regard to this, Ramelli and Lucchetta (2004: 59) aptly explain that “il rifiuto del metodo allegorico 
applicato al mito dipende dai poeti, che non attingono alla verità: perciò è vana l’esegesi allegorica che cerca 
di svelare nelle loro opere una supposta verità espressa simbolicamente”. Pichler (2006: 30, n. 55) puts forward 
a similar diagnosis: “Die Frage nach einer ὑπόνοια, die erst die διάνοια des Autors verständlich machen soll, spielt 
für das Erreichen der Arete keine Rolle”.
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In rem I 110, 7: … τὴν ῾Ομήρου διάνοιαν ἔνθεον οὖσαν … I 112, 2–3: … ὁ ποιητὴς … ἐνθέως 
… φησιν or I 120, 6: … ἡ ἔνθεος ποίησις …).6
Thus, the above discussed Platonic onslaught on the poetry of Homer has left Proclus 
with the following dilemma. If Plato’s disparagement of Homer is right, then the entire 
traditional paideia that builds on the sacred authority of the poet has to be repudiated. 
If, on the other hand, Plato’s censure of Homer is wrong, then the whole Neoplatonic 
tradition that builds on the infallible authority of the philosopher needs to be called into 
question.7 As things stand, then, it seems impossible to preserve the intact authority of 
both Homer and Plato, for one is clearly caught between the devil of discarding the poet 
and the deep blue sea of doubting the philosopher.
When trying to steer clear between the Scylla of rejecting Homer and the Charyb-
dis of betraying Plato, Proclus makes two important  assumptions. Firstly, he is will-
ing to acquiesce (In rem I 80, 4–5) that “the Homeric myths do not imitate the divinity 
well” (τοὺς ῾Ομηρικοὺς μύθους οὐκ εὖ μεμιμῆσθαι […] τὸ θεῖον), whilst, at the same 
time, he argues (In rem I 198, 14) that apart from the mimetic poetry that Plato quite 
rightly condemns there is also a higher form of poetry which “explains the divine matters 
through symbols” (διὰ συμβόλων τὰ θεῖα ἀφερμηνεύουσα). Secondly and relatedly, 
Proclus makes the following assumption: 
It seems to me that the grim, monstrous, and unnatural character of poetic fictions moves the 
listener in every way to a search for the truth, and draws him toward the secret knowledge; it 
does not allow him, as would be the case with something that possessed a surface probability, to 
remain with the thoughts placed before him. It compels him, instead, to enter into the interior 
of the myths and to busy himself with the thought which has been concealed, out of sight by 
the makers of myth and to ponder what kinds of natures and what great powers they introdu-
ced into the meaning of the myths and communicated to posterity by means of symbols such 
as these.
δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ τὸ τῶν ποιητικῶν πλασμάτων τραγικὸν καὶ τὸ τερατῶδες καὶ τὸ παρὰ 
φύσιν κινεῖν τοὺς ἀκούοντας παντοδαπῶς εἰς τὴν τῆς ἀληθείας ζήτησιν καὶ εἶναι πρὸς τὴν 
ἀπόρρητον γνῶσιν ὁλκὸν καὶ μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν ἡμῖν διὰ τὴν φαινομένην πιθανότητα μένειν ἐπὶ 
τῶν προβεβλημένων ἐννοιῶν, ἀλλ’ ἀναγκάζειν εἰς τὸ ἐντὸς τῶν μύθων διαβάλλειν καὶ τὸν 
κεκρυμμένον ἐν ἀφανεῖ τῶν μυθοπλαστῶν περιεργάζεσθαι νοῦν, καὶ θεωρεῖν ὁποίας μὲν 
6  Lamberton (1986: 22–31) offers a thorough discussion of this ancient view of Homer as ὁ θεολόγος and of 
Proclus’ account of Homer’s ἔνθεος ποίησις (1986: 181–183). See also Pichler (2006: 67–68). In connection with 
the assumption that “Platon est un théologien”, Brisson (1996: 122) rightly stresses that this assumption defined 
a double task for the School of Athens: “dégager de l’œuvre de Platon cette théologie et montrer qu’elle s’ac-
corde avec toutes les autres théologies: celle de Pythagore, celle des Oracles chaldaïques, celle d’Orphée, et celles 
d’Homère et d’Hésiode”. Leaving aside the question of Plato’s irony, we should note that the philosopher can 
at times speak very highly of the poets – an opportunity that was seized by Proclus (cf. In rem I 154, 12–159, 6).
7  Cf. e.g. Coulter (1976: 46, 112–115); Lamberton (1986: 182–183 and 2000: 80) and Brisson (1996: 
138–139).
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φύσεις, ἡλίκας δὲ δυνάμεις ἐκεῖνοι λαβόντες εἰς τὴν αὐτῶν διάνοιαν τοῖσδε τοῖς συμβόλοις 
αὐτὰς τοῖς μεθ’ ἑαυτοὺς ἐσήμηναν.8
These two assumptions constitute the cornerstone of Proclus’ hermeneutics: on the 
one hand, poetry is much more than just a mimesis and, on the other hand, poetry has to 
be read appropriately (i.e., allegorically) so that the poet’s art could perform its salvific 
function. In other words, Proclus argues that it is only when a poet is reduced to a mere 
“imitator” that his poetry rightly repels us as crude, naïve and even blasphemous. More 
often than not, however, such poetry transpires to be divinely inspired and truly trans-
formative, when the poet is taken symbolically.  
New tools of poetry: σύμβολα in lieu of μιμήματα
As noted above, Plato rejects mimetic art on the grounds that it makes an abortive and 
manipulative attempt at imitating the phenomenal world: since poetry mimics the lowest 
level of reality, it deludes and debases the souls that are exposed to its pernicious spell. 
In response to the Platonic attack on poetic mimesis, Proclus diagnoses that it is only 
one type of art that deserves to be condemned as such a false imitation. Thus, Proclus 
famously distinguishes (In rem I 177, 4–196, 13) between three kinds of poetry that corre-
spond to particular “states” (ἕξεις) of the soul from the lowest to the highest; these types 
of poetry being the mimetic, the didactic and the inspired one.9 When presenting his 
theory of the three psychic conditions and the related poetic modes, Proclus specifically 
insists that there is a type of poetry that is perfectly capable of reaching the true reality 
(the intelligible world). When contrasting the imitative and the symbolic mode of poetic 
composition, Proclus argues that while the former is not suitable for theology, the latter 
is its indispensable tool.
The lowest type of poetry corresponds to the lowest life of the soul that is character-
ized (In rem I 178, 3–4) by “inferior powers” (καταδεεστέραις δυνάμεσιν) and “imagi-
nations as well as irrational sensations” (φαντασίαις τε καὶ αἰσθήσεσιν ἀλόγοις). Whilst 
this is the life that people lead when they immerse themselves in the sensible world 
and renounce philosophy altogether, the poetry that reflects this state of the soul is 
described by Proclus (In rem I 179, 16–17) as “mixed together with opinions and imagina-
8  Procl. In rem I 85, 16–26. Translation by Coulter (1976: 57). Brisson (1996: 141) nicely explains (ad loc.) 
that the grotesque character of myths presupposes the concept of double reference: “C’est le caractère scan-
daleux du mythe qui indique la nécessité de l’interpréter. Une telle interprétation se fonde sur la notion de double 
référence. Le discours mythique sert de limite entre le monde des apparences et celui de la réalité véritable; 
il renvoie de ce côté-ci aux êtres d’ici-bas, et de l’autre côté aux réalités du monde d’en haut”. Cf. also Cardullo 
(1985: 132).
9  Cf. e.g. Gallavotti (1933: 44–54), Friedl (1936: 56–59); Buffière (1956: 27–31); Coulter (1976: 107–108); 
Sheppard (1980: 162–202); Lamberton (1986: 188–196); Brisson (1996: 142–144); van den Berg (2001: 
115–142); Struck (2004: 241–243) and Chlup (2012: 186–188).
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tions” (δόξαις καὶ φαντασίαις συμμιγνυμένη), “filled up with imitation” (διὰ μιμήσεως 
συμπληρουμένη) and, thereby, “nothing else than mimetic” (οὐδὲν ἀλλ’ ἢ μιμητική).
The lowest type of poetry is obviously mimetic, as it aims to imitate the sensible world. 
However, mimetic poetry can imitate the world of phenomena correctly or incorrectly. 
In the former case, it is labeled as eikastic, whereas in the latter – it is characterized as 
phantastic. Thus, Proclus  clarifies (In rem I 179, 29–32) that the former “produces imag-
es” (εἰκαστικόν) and “strains for the correctness of its imitation” (πρὸς τὴν ὀρθότητα 
τοῦ μιμήματος ἀνατείνεται), whilst the latter “produces phantasms” (φανταστικόν) and 
“offers solely apparent imitation” (φαινομένην μόνον τὴν μίμησιν παρεχόμενον).10 While 
mimetic poetry might, then, attempt to adequately imitate the truth or forsake it entire-
ly in favor of fabrications, Proclus suggests that Plato’s criticism of Homer is valid with 
regard to the latter type of poetry. Needless to say, however, it is only sporadically that 
Homer is guilty of such imitative poetry that incorrectly mimics the sensible world.11
The second type of poetry is ascribed to the life of the soul that can reach “the being 
of the beings” (τὴν οὐσίαν τῶν ὄντων),12 upon which this poetry is characterized by 
Proclus as: 
full of advice and the best counsel and packed with intelligent moderation: it offers participation 
in prudence and the other virtues to those so inclined by nature. 
νουθεσίας καὶ συμβουλῶν ἀρίστων πλήρη καὶ νοερᾶς εὐμετρίας ἀνάμεστα φρονήσεώς τε καὶ 
τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς προτείνοντα τὴν μετουσίαν τοῖς εὖ πεφυκόσιν.13
While this kind of poetry has been labeled as “didactic”14 or “scientific”,15 it treats of 
such issues as the making of the universe, the nature of the soul or the individual’s moral 
duties. Hence, its primary fields of investigation fall within the scope of physics and ethics 
10  When putting forward this distinction, Proclus cites (In rem I 189, 3–190, 2) the Sophist, where Plato 
famously differentiates (235 d 1–236 c 7) between “two kinds of mimetic art” (δύο […] εἴδη τῆς μιμητικῆς): the 
art of producing images (εἰκαστικὴ τέχνη) is said to imitate “according to the proportions of the model” (κατὰ 
τὰς τοῦ παραδείγματος συμμετρίας), whereas the art of producing phantasms (φανταστική) is said to bring 
out “not the actual proportions but the ones that [only] have an appearance of being beautiful” (οὐ τὰς οὔσας 
συμμετρίας ἀλλὰ τὰς δοξούσας εἶναι καλάς), since here the imitators “renounce the truth” (οὐ χαίρειν τὸ ἀληθὲς 
ἐάσαντες). It should be noted here that Plato actually rejects both types of mimetic art (i.e., φανταστική as well 
as εἰκαστική). For a justification of this view, see Sheppard (1980: 188–189).
11  Proclus diagnoses (In rem I 192, 21–28) that Homer’s poetry produces phantasms when the poet has the 
sun sprang up out of the lake (Od. III 1).
12  Procl. In rem I 179, 6. Translation by van den Berg (2001: 116).
13  Procl. In rem I 179, 10–13. Translation by Lamberton (1986: 191).
14  Sheppard explains (1980: 183) that although Proclus ascribes educational value to all poetry, he, never-
theless, explicitly singles out one particular kind of poetry as didactic on the basis of how it presents its material: 
the defining characteristic of didactic poetry is that it teaches directly. It may not be superfluous to note that 
Proclus’ treatment of the Works and Days suggests that he viewed the poem as didactic and not inspired poetry, 
see Sheppard (2014: 71) with references.
15  van den Berg (2001) offers a reconsideration of Sheppard’s (1980) account of the second type of poetry.
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rather than theology. Proclus stresses (In rem I 198, 21) that a distinctive feature of this 
type of poetry is that it characterizes a life which departs from deceptive imitation and 
proceeds towards knowledge or science (ἐπιστήμη). Importantly, however, this life of 
the soul and the corresponding poetry aim to know the truth rather than unite with it. 
The highest life of the soul takes the form of a union with the divine (i.e., the One and/
or the gods).16 In this state, the soul is said (In rem I 177, 16) to be “connected with the gods” 
(συνάπτεται τοῖς θεοῖς), whilst the poetry that reflects this state of the soul is defined 
(In rem I 178, 24–25) as “madness superior to moderation” (μανία […] σωφροσύνης 
κρείττων). Undoubtedly, the most noteworthy characteristic of the highest kind of poet-
ry is that it conveys its message through “symbols” (σύμβολα) or “tokens” (συνθήματα), 
rather than through “images” (εἰκόνες).17 Consequently, its defining feature is that it is not 
mimetic sensu stricto, since there is no mirror-like similarity between the poetic portrayal 
of an event and the theological truth that is cloaked in this fictive world.
Although this symbolic poetry is still characterized as “mimetic”, Proclus significantly 
reinterprets the concept of “imitation”, as he asserts (In rem I 198, 15–16) that “symbols 
are not imitations of those things which they are symbols of” (τὰ γὰρ σύμβολα τούτων, 
ὧν ἐστι σύμβολα, μιμήματα οὐκ ἔστιν). When describing the specificity of this symbol-
ic “imitation”, Proclus further elucidates (In rem I 198, 16–18) that symbols can actually 
be the very “opposite” (ἐναντία) of their referents, such as, for example: “the shame-
ful of the beautiful and that which is contrary to nature of that which is in accord with 
nature” (τοῦ καλοῦ τὸ αἰσχρόν, καὶ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν τὸ παρὰ φύσιν). The assumption that 
symbols can be the opposite of what they stand for makes it possible for Proclus to answer 
three important and interrelated questions: 1) What is the difference between Plato’s and 
Homer’s myth-making? 2) Why can the highest kind of poetry be represented by various 
horrifying and abominable deeds of the deities? 3) How should such outrageous passages 
be read if this divinely inspired poetry is to fulfil its soteriological function?
16  Buffière (1956: 27) rightly notes that this state “n’est autre que la contemplation plotinienne”.
17  Two points deserve to be made here. First of all, it has to be stressed that the distinction between the 
terms σύμβολον and εἰκών can be rather fuzzy in Proclus, cf. e.g. Dillon (1976: 254); Cardullo (1985: 178) and 
van den Berg (2001: 123). The scholars have emphasized that Proclus seems, at times, to be using the two prac-
tically synonymously, a spectacular example being In Euclid. 128, 26: σύμβολον … καὶ εἰκόνα (see van den Berg 
2001: 123, n. 45 for more examples). Relatedly, the terms σύμβολον and σύνθημα are also frequently used inter-
changeably by Proclus, especially in the fields of exegesis and theurgy; cf. e.g. Müri (1976: 34, 40–42); Shep-
pard (1980: 145–161); van den Berg (2001:  93–101); Struck (2004: 234) and Chlup (2012: 192). In his classical 
study, Müri (1976: 9) has traced the origins of this synonimity to such interrelated meanings as “Erkennungszei-
chen”, “Erkennungswort” and “Losung”, an illustrative example being Euripides’ Rhesus 572: σύνθημα and 573: 
σύμβολον (see Müri 1976: 9 for more examples). As far as the complex relationship between the terms εἰκών, 
σύμβολον and σύνθημα in Proclus is concerned, Cardullo (1985) offers the most extensive and elaborate study of 
this issue. Yet, while the scholar finds, for example, “una sottile ma pur sempre individuabile differenza” between 
σύνθημα and σύμβολον in the sixth dissertation of Proclus’ commentary (Cardullo 1985: 163–164), these inter-
esting semantic nuances will not be discussed in what follows (for a fascinating overview, see Cardullo 1985: 
209–223).
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Plato’s and Homer’s μυθοποιΐα: the παιδευτική and ἐνθεαστική division
By Proclus’ time, terms such as “myth” and “symbol” came to be frequently used inter-
changeably with reference to any allegorical sense, since myths were typically perceived 
as symbolic of higher truths.18 Proclus’ commentary to the Timaeus provides us with 
an example, when the philosopher famously observes (I 30, 14–15) that “myths usual-
ly indicate things through symbols” (οἱ μῦθοι τὰ πολλὰ διὰ τῶν συμβόλων εἰώθασι 
τὰ πράγματα ἐνδείκνυσθαι). Proclus makes this remark in connection with his argu-
ment (I 30, 11–14) that the summary of the Republic explains the making of the universe 
“through images” (εἰκονικῶς), whilst the narrative about Atlantis does the same “through 
symbols” (συμβολικῶς).19 What is interesting about this observation is that it suggests 
a willingness on Proclus’ part to allegorically interpret any myth.20 If, however, all myths 
can be regarded as allegories of higher truths, then this raises the question about the 
difference between the myths of Plato and those of Homer.
Proclus provides us with an answer to the question somewhat earlier (In Tim. I 30, 
4–10) when he refers to the Pythagorean custom (ἔθος) of teaching first with likenesses 
(τῶν ὁμοίων), then with images (τῶν εἰκόνων) and finally with symbols (τῶν συμβόλων). 
This means that although all myths can be examined with respect to their allegorical 
sense, some are merely preparatory, whereas others address individuals who have 
attained a certain level of initiation. Thus, Proclus famously assumes (In rem I 76, 17–86, 
23) that a myth can be either παιδευτικός (“educational”, “pedagogic”) or ἐνθεαστικός 
(“inspirational”, “divinely inspired”). According to this dichotomy, paideutic myths are 
designed as an introductory guidance for those individuals who are still under training, 
whereas entheastic myths are for those few who have progressed in their training suffi-
ciently to be able to reach the Intellect, the gods and the true reality.21
18  This has been duly stressed by, among others, Pépin and Müri. Thus, Pépin (1976: 78) aptly observes 
that “l’Antiquité (…) emploie à peu près indifféremment (…) les termes de «mythe», «allégorie», «métaphore», 
«figure», «symbole», «signe», etc.”. Somewhat further, Pépin (1976: 90–91) expands the list to include such 
concepts as μῦθος, τύπος, τρόπος, μύθευμα, πλάσμα, μίμημα, fabula, fictio, figmentum, significatio, insinuatio, 
similtudo, figura, rightly diagnosing that the common denominator of all these concepts is that they allow one 
“d’exprimer une chose en semblant en dire une autre, généralement plus concrète”. In a similar vein, though in 
a somewhat different context, Müri (1976: 28) notes that the concept of symbol (along with τεκμήριον and 
σημεῖον) came to play an important role in the development of allegoresis, since “auch der Mythendeuter die 
Spannung zwischen wörtlicher und erzwungener Aussage, den Abstand von Zeichen und Bezeichnetem, spürte”.
19  Coulter (1976: 41) stresses (ad loc.) that the distinction between εἰκονικῶς and συμβολικῶς that Proclus 
mentions in his commentary to the Timaeus is further elaborated in his commentary to the Republic. Incidental-
ly, however, his rendition of the original ἐνδείκνυσθαι as “hint at” does not seem that fortunate, since it would 
be more appropriate for αἰνίσσεσθαι. Thus, Tarrant (2007: 125), for example, translates this crucial passage 
as follows: “in general myths have the tendency to give an indication of things through symbols”. Although in 
a quite different context, Pépin (2000: 3–4) has interestingly suggested that the term ἔνδειξις be translated into 
French as “indice” rather than “indication”.
20  With respect to Proclus’ interpretation of the Atlantis story, Sheppard (2014: 63) points out that Proclus 
treats this narrative “in the same way as he treats Homer or the Orphic poems”.
21  Cf. e.g. Coulter (1976: 49) and Cardullo (1985: 94, 149). See also Lamberton (1986: 197).
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The implication of this dichotomy is that the myths of Plato are primarily paideu-
tic, whilst those of Homer are predominantly entheastic.22 The former are, then, labeled 
(In rem I 79, 12–14) as “more philosophical” (φιλοσοφώτεροι) and the latter are charac-
terized as “belonging  to the sacred rites” (τοῖς ἱερατικοῖς θεσμοῖς προσήκοντες). Hence, 
although all myths can be treated as allegories of higher truths, the difference between 
the myths of Plato and those of Homer consists in that the former serve the function of 
preparing young minds for the latter. Education must, therefore, begin with philosophical 
myths and culminate in hieratic myths. In this way, the student moves from the human 
towards the divine, since the former enable him to reach the intelligible realm, whereas 
the latter make it possible for him to unite with the gods.23
That is precisely why paideutic myths use “images” (εἰκόνες) that are “imitations” 
(μιμήματα) which seek to resemble their models as accurately as possible, whereas enthe-
astic myths employ “symbols” (σύμβολα) that do not imitate, but rather hint at their 
referents through analogy (ἀναλογία).24 While entheastic myths are, thus, symbolic,25 
Proclus explains that the creators of such myths:
indicate some things by means of others, but not as using images in order to signify their models; 
rather, they use symbols that are in sympathy with their referents by means of analogy.
ἄλλα ἐξ ἄλλων ἐνδείκνυται, καὶ οὐ τὰ μὲν εἰκόνες, τὰ δὲ παραδείγματα, ὅσα διὰ τούτων 
σημαίνουσιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν σύμβολα, τὰ δὲ ἐξ ἀναλογίας ἔχει τὴν πρὸς ταῦτα συμπάθειαν.26
As inspirational myths employ symbols rather than images, they make no preten-
sions to accurately imitate their referents. As these symbolic myths signify their refer-
ents through analogy rather than mimesis, Proclus can say (In rem I 198, 18–19) that “the 
symbolic mode indicates the nature of things even through what is most opposite to them” 
(ἡ δὲ συμβολικὴ θεωρία καὶ διὰ τῶν ἐναντιωτάτων τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων ἐνδείκνυται 
22  The difficulty is here that this dichotomy might prima facie suggest that Proclus perceived (the myths of ) 
Plato to be somehow inferior to (those of ) Homer (for such a conclusion, see e.g. Coulter 1976: 109). Neverthe-
less, educational myths should not be rashly equated with didactic poetry, since the relation between the two 
is very obscure in Proclus (cf. Sheppard 1980: 194). As we shall shortly see, the difference between Homer and 
Plato lies in the form rather than in the content: Plato and Homer offer the same truth, but the philosopher speaks 
from reason, whereas the poet speaks from revelation. Cf. infra, n. 32.
23  Cf. van den Berg (2001: 132 and 134–135). 
24  Cf. e.g. Coulter (1976: 47–57); van den Berg (2001: 119–136) and Chlup (2012: 188–189). The latter 
two works offer a compelling criticism of the interpretation put forward by Sheppard (1980: 197) that analogy 
applies to images and not to symbols.
25  A somewhat difficult issue is whether myth is to be associated with both the inspirational and the symbol-
ic mode of exposition, or just with one of them. With regard to this, Gersh (2000: 18) has interestingly suggested 
that “(a) when Proclus considers Plato alone as theologian, he ranks the entheastic mode of exposition above 
the symbolic; and (b) when he considers Plato and Homer together as theologians, he allows the entheastic and 
symbolic modes of exposition to coincide”.
26  Procl. In rem I 86, 16–19. Translation by Chlup (2012: 188).
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φύσιν).27 Naturally, Proclus insists that the relationship between the symbol and its refer-
ent can never be reduced to a mirror image or reflection so as to demonstrate that Plato’s 
criticism of mimetic art does not apply to the entheastic (symbolic) myths. 
This becomes clear when Proclus contrasts the myths of Homer with those created by 
Plato.28 According to Proclus, Plato was very careful not to portray the gods in an outra-
geous and blasphemous way: when coining his pedagogical myths, Plato employed imag-
es so as to educate about the divine matters. Hence, his myths imitate the gods without 
depraving and/or deluding young minds. Thus, Proclus stresses (In rem I 73, 16–22) that 
Plato “mystically explains the divine matters through certain images” (διά τινων εἰκόνων 
τὰ θεῖα μυστικῶς ἀναδιδάσκει) in such a manner that his “portrayals” (ἀπεικασμένα) and 
“likenesses” (ὁμοιώματα) are very much “like visible statues” (οἷον ἀγάλματα ἐμφανῆ).29 
This means that Plato’s myths imitate the gods in the same way as the statues of 
the gods imitate them, i.e., in both cases the imitation builds on an easily recognizable 
resemblance, albeit it always remains only an approximate rendition of the divine. Coin-
ing paideutic myths is similar to carving statues in that both these activities strive for 
some similarity when exploiting the visible (ὕλη) to represent the invisible (τὰ θεῖα) – 
the difference being naturally that a mythmaker uses words, whereas a sculptor uses 
stones. This explains why Plato’s paideutic myths are free from any shocking and horri-
fying motifs that Homer’s entheastic myths abound in: when presenting his hidden 
doctrines about the gods, Plato employed images (εἰκόνες / ἀπεικασμένα) and likeness-
es (ὁμοιώματα), upon which his portrayals of the deities are never opposite or contrary 
to the nature of the gods, but rather these depictions of the deities retain the similarity of 
the statues (οἷον ἀγάλματα). 
Things look quite different, though, with the entheastic (symbolic) myths. While here 
the mythmaker must also have recourse to words, he is not bound by the requirement 
that his portrayal resemble the gods. That is why the authors of entheastic myths use the 
crude language of anthropomorphism. They employ that which is inferior to somehow 
represent that which is so superior that it cannot be rendered mimetically, but rather 
symbolically:
The fathers of myth observed that nature was creating images of nonmaterial and noetic Forms 
and embellishing this cosmos with these imitations, depicting the indivisible by means of frag-
mented things, the eternal by means of things that proceed through time, the noetic through that 
which the senses can grasp, and portraying the nonmaterial materially, the nonspatial spatially 
27  van den Berg (2001: 120–125) has excellently shown though that symbols do not have to be absolutely 
opposed to their referents. See also Chlup (2012: 189). Cf. infra, n. 36.
28  Cf. e.g. van den Berg (2001: 122 and 131) and Chlup (2012: 188).
29  Coulter (1976: 48) suggests (ad loc.) that Proclus might be alluding here to the celestial myth of the 
Phaedrus. While Sheppard (1980: 149) rightly stresses that the term μυστικῶς is used here in the sense of both 
allegoresis and mysteries, Müri (1976:  31) provides a very good explanation for this fact: “Mysterien und Alle-
gorese haben ein gemeinsames Merkmal: die Scheidung zwischen Eingeweihten und Außenstehenden”.
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and depicting through things subject to change that which is eternally the same. When they saw 
this, in line with the nature and the procession of those things which have only apparent and 
imagelike existence, they themselves fabricated images of the divine in the medium of language, 
expressing the transcendent power of the models by those things most opposite to them and 
furthest removed from them: that which is beyond nature is represented by things contrary to 
nature; that which is more divine than all reason, by the irrational; that which transcends in 
simplicity all fragmented  beauty, by things that are considered ugly and obscene. 
κατιδόντες γὰρ οἱ τῆς μυθοποιΐας πατέρες, ὅτι καὶ ἡ φύσις εἰκόνας δημιουργοῦσα τῶν ἀΰλων 
καὶ νοητῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τόνδε τὸν κόσμον ποικίλλουσα τοῖς τούτων μιμήμασιν τὰ μὲν ἀμέριστα 
μεριστῶς ἀπεικονίζεται, τὰ δὲ αἰώνια διὰ τῶν κατὰ χρόνον προϊόντων, τὰ δὲ νοητὰ διὰ τῶν 
αἰσθητῶν, ἐνύλως τε τὸ ἄϋλον ἀποτυποῦται καὶ διαστατῶς τὸ ἀδιάστατον καὶ διὰ μεταβολῆς 
τὸ μονίμως ἱδρυμένον, ἑπομένως τῇ τε φύσει καὶ τῇ προόδῳ τῶν φαινομένως ὄντων καὶ 
εἰδωλικῶς, εἰκόνας καὶ αὐτοὶ πλάττοντες ἐν λόγοις φερομένας τῶν θείων τοῖς ἐναντιωτάτοις 
καὶ πλεῖστον ἀφεστηκόσιν τὴν ὑπερέχουσαν τῶν παραδειγμάτων ἀπομιμοῦνται δύναμιν, καὶ 
τοῖς μὲν παρὰ φύσιν τὸ ὑπὲρ φύσιν αὐτῶν ἐνδείκνυνται, τοῖς δὲ παραλόγοις τὸ παντὸς λόγου 
θειότερον, τοῖς δὲ φανταζομένοις ὡς αἰσχροῖς τὸ παντὸς μεριστοῦ κάλλους ὑπερηπλωμένον.30 
In this beautiful passage, Proclus stresses that it was the nature of the things that has 
inspired the poets to write symbolically. Just as that which is eternal must be portrayed 
through that which is transient and that which is intelligible through that which is sensi-
ble, so the creators of entheastic myths have to depict the transcendence of the gods 
through what is, in fact, most contradictory to them: thus, they describe that which 
surpasses nature through that which is unnatural, whereas that which surpasses all 
reason through that which is irrational. Hence, whenever Homeric myths strike us as 
grotesque and bizarre to the point of blasphemous, it has to be borne in mind that these 
anthropomorphic formulations are the only means for communicating the divine. Impor-
tantly, Proclus puts it in no uncertain terms that mythmakers employ this symbolism 
precisely to make us aware of the “transcending superiority” (ἐξῃρημένη ὑπεροχή) of the 
gods.31 This means that the authors of entheastic myths coin these stories in such a way 
that these disgraceful portrayals of the gods make men conscious of the unbridgeable 
chasm separating humans from gods, while at the same time leaving no doubt that the 
narratives must be taken allegorically.
Everything that has been said so far makes it possible to see how Proclus 
perceives the difference between Homer and Plato. The philosopher characterizes 
(In rem I 159, 1) the former as “divinely inspired” (ἐνθουσιάζων) and “driven to Bacchic 
frenzy” (ἀναβακχευόμενος), stressing, at the same time though (In rem I 159, 3–4), that 
Plato provides us with the same truth, which he merely “bound fast with the irrefutable 
30  Procl. In rem I 77, 13–27. Translation by Struck (2004: 243). See also Cardullo (1985: 150); van den Berg 
(2001: 125) and Chlup (2012: 191).
31  Procl. In rem I 77, 28. Translation by van den Berg (2001: 125). Cf. also Chlup (2012: 191).
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methods of knowledge” (ταῖς ἀνελέγκτοις τῆς ἐπιστήμης μεθόδοις κατεδήσατο). This 
means that the difference between Homer and Plato resides in the form rather than in 
the content: the poet and the philosopher present the same truth, but the former speaks 
from revelation, whereas the latter speaks from reason.32 That is why the narratives of the 
poet require a special exegetical approach.
Allegorical approach to Homer’s παραπέτασμα 
Evidently, then, one has to apply allegorical interpretation to entheastic myths so as to 
properly identify the connection between the symbol and its referent. Thus, allegoresis 
makes us aware of the fact that it is only when we read Homer mimetically that his poet-
ry seems crude and offensive, but when we read the poet symbolically, his poetry tran-
spires to be theology κατ’ ἐξοχήν. Accordingly, it is necessary to distinguish (In rem I 140, 
11–13) between the “ineffable wisdom” (ἀπόρρητος θεωρία) concealed in the Homer-
ic poems and their “apparent meaning” (τὸ φαινόμενον).33 While Homer’s epics must 
not be reduced to their surface meaning, Proclus frequently characterizes this meaning 
as παραπέτασμα (i.e., “cover”, “veil”  or “screen”) to indicate that beneath this veneer 
a deeper (i.e., symbolic) sense has been hidden.34 In other words, this παραπέτασμα hints 
enigmatically at a latent meaning that has to be retrieved through allegorical interpreta-
tion if the Iliad and the Odyssey are to be fully understood and appreciated. 
Proclus provides us with a spectacular example of this kind of exegesis, when he 
famously interprets the hurling of Hephaestus as “the procession of the divine from above 
down to the lowest creations in the realm of the senses” (ἡ ἄνωθεν ἄχρι τῶν τελευταίων 
ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς δημιουργημάτων τοῦ θείου πρόοδος), the binding of Kronos – as “the 
union of the whole of creation with the noetic and paternal transcendence of Kronos” 
32  As Buffière (1956: 29) nicely puts it: “Belle revanche pour Homère: l’exilé de la République revient en 
triomphateur; il prend place à côté de Platon et au-dessus de lui: car si Platon est pour les siens la plus haute 
autorité humaine, Homère est une autorité divine; l’un représente les lumières de la raison, l’autre celles de 
la révélation”. Cf. also Cardullo (1985: 101). In a similar vein, Lamberton (1986: 170) explains that Plato and 
Homer actually revealed in their myths the same ultimate truth: “Homer’s account of that truth is inspired – it 
is the product of divine μανία – and its value is therefore enormous, though its expression is correspondingly 
obscure. Plato came later to the same truth, often in fact starting from Homer’s account of it, and demonstrated 
it more systematically”. 
33  Pichler (2006: 83 n. 183) correctly stresses that the term φαινόμενον “bezeichnet bei Proklos stets das, 
was der sinnlichen Betrachtung zugänglich ist”.
34  Cf. e.g. Procl. In rem I 44, 14, 66, 7, 73, 15–16, 74, 19, 159, 15–16, II 248, 27–28. Brisson (1996: 140) 
explains the παραπέτασμα metaphor in the following way: “Le discours mythique est assimilé à un objet placé 
devant un autre pour le cacher”. See also Lamberton (1986: 185) and Sheppard (1980: 16), who stresses that the 
term is a standard way of signaling that a given myth requires allegorical interpretation. While Proclus speaks 
also (In rem I 44, 19–20) of τὸ πρόσχημα τῆς μυθοποιΐας, both these terms and the underlying idea appear in 
Plato’s Protagoras (cf. e.g. 316 d 6: πρόσχημα and 316 e 5: παραπετάσμασιν). Finally, it may not be superfluous to 
note that Proclus uses also other terms with the reference to allegorical interpretation. Thus, for example, in the 
Theologia Platonica (I 22, 19–20) the classical term ὑπόνοια is used to define the purpose of physical allegoresis: 
τέλος ποιεῖσθαι τῆς τῶν μύθων ὑπονοίας τὰ φυσικὰ παθήματα – cf. Pépin (1976: 86). Cf. supra, n. 4.
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(ἡ ἕνωσις τῆς ὅλης δημιουργίας πρὸς τὴν νοερὰν τοῦ Κρόνου καὶ πατρικὴν ὑπεροχήν), 
and the castration of Ouranos – as “the separation of the Titanic chain from the order 
that maintains the universe” (ἡ διάκρισις τῆς Τιτανικῆς σειρᾶς ἀπὸ τῆς συνεκτικῆς 
διακοσμήσεως).35 
This piece of allegorical interpretation shows that the symbols which appear in enthe-
astic myths are not absolutely opposed to their referents.36 Obviously, we have here no 
copy-like images (εἰκόνες / ἀπεικασμένα) or accurate likenesses (ὁμοιώματα) and these 
symbolic portrayals of the deities are not like (οἷον) their physical statues. Nevertheless, 
there is some sort of similarity that provides a symbolic connection between hurling 
and procession, binding and union, castration and separation, etc. While these depictions 
signify their referents through analogy rather than mimesis, the relationship between 
symbols and their referents in entheastic myths is, thereby, motivated. The  analogy may 
be at times very obscure, but a skillful interpreter will be able to ascertain that hurling 
hints enigmatically at a procession, binding – at a union, castration – at a separation, and 
so on
That is why Proclus further explains (In rem I 82, 20–83, 7) that what “in our 
world” (παρ’ ἡμῖν) is perceived as “lower” (χεῖρον) and belonging to the “inferior” 
(καταδεεστέρας) order of reality, the myths employ with reference to the “superi-
or nature” (κρείττονα φύσιν) in such a way that binding can stand for a “conjunction 
with the causes and ineffable union” (συναφὴ πρὸς τὰ αἴτια καὶ ἕνωσις ἄρρητος) rather 
than an obstruction, hurling can stand for “the generative procession as well as free and 
unrestrained presence in everything” (ἡ γόνιμος […] πρόοδος καὶ ἡ ἄφετος ἐπὶ πάντα 
παρουσία καὶ εὔλυτος) rather than a violent movement, and castration can stand for 
a “procession of second-order beings from their own causes to a lower order” (πρόοδος 
τῶν δευτέρων εἰς ὑφειμένην τάξιν ἀπὸ τῶν σφετέρων αἰτίων) rather than a loss of 
power.
The opposition between the inferior meaning that corresponds to the sensible world 
(παρ’ ἡμῖν / ἐνταῦθα) and the superior meaning that the corresponds to the intelligi-
ble world (παρὰ τοῖς θεοῖς / ἐκεῖ) is employed by Proclus to differentiate between the 
literal and the allegorical sense of a narrative. This distinction provides the foundation 
for Proclus’ apology of Homer: when seeking to exonerate Homer from the charges 
that Plato has levelled against τὸ μέγιστον ψεῦδος, Proclus argues that Homer’s poet-
ry is predominantly symbolic, i.e., that the low and base language of the myths is only 
a symbolic description of the highest realities. 
35  Procl. In rem I 82, 10–18. Translation by Struck (2004: 251). Cf. also Coulter (1976: 53); Cardullo (1985: 
128) and Lamberton (1986: 204). The latter work offers an extensive discussion of Proclus’ specific allegorical 
interpretations (see Lamberton 1986: 197–232).
36  Cf. supra, n. 27.
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From the Neoplatonist perspective, all poems about the gods have to be allegorical, 
for the transcendence of the gods precludes accuracy of all human accounts of them 
(whether poetical or philosophical).37 As no language can do justice to the immaterial 
and unchanging reality that it seeks to represent, literal portrayals of the gods as anthro-
pomorphic beings must be taken as necessary concessions on the part of the poet. As the 
superior is, in fact, indescribable and inexpressible, these symbolic renditions are neces-
sarily grotesque and monstrous. That is precisely how they make us aware of the fact that 
what they endeavor to describe and express is, indeed, indescribable and inexpressible. 
The apparently irreverent and sacrilegious descriptions of the gods must, then, be seen 
as necessarily material analogies that symbolically hint at the higher immaterial realities. 
Given that there is no direct similarity or copy-like resemblance between the symbol and 
its referent, it is only reasonable that the “binding” of one god by another can symbolical-
ly signify an “ineffable union”, whereas the “hurling” of one god by another can symboli-
cally signify a “generative procession”. Irrespective of how imperfect these material anal-
ogies might seem, such renditions remain the only means for representing the divine. 
Allegoresis shows, then, that it is only on the surface that Homer’s naïve and/or blas-
phemous portrayals of the deities are irreligious, since underneath them a profound 
theology can be found.38 As a matter of fact, these seemingly shocking descriptions of 
the gods are the best proof that the poetry of Homer is indeed divinely inspired and 
that the passages which Plato most vehemently attacks must actually be taken as the 
most symbolic (i.e., non-mimetic) ones. When this hermeneutical principle is applied, 
such horrifying deeds of the deities as banishment, imprisonment or castration of one 
god by another testify precisely to the divinely inspired authority of the poet. That is 
why Proclus insists (In rem I 193, 14–16) that when creating such myths the poet must 
have been “inspired by the gods” (ἐνθουσιάζειν) and “possessed by the Muses” (ἐκ τῶν 
Μουσῶν κατοκωχήν). That is also why he maintains (In rem I 198, 20–23) that a “divinely 
inspired poet” (ποιητὴς ἔνθους), who “reveals the truth about beings through signs” (διὰ 
συνθημάτων δηλοῖ τὴν περὶ τῶν ὄντων ἀλήθειαν) is actually “not an imitator” (οὔτε 
μιμητής). 
These assertions show that the highest kind of poetry transcends the limitations of 
the mimetic one. A divinely inspired poet resorts to the crude and anthropomorphic 
language of myths to somehow represent the divine matters. While the various myth-
ical formulations (“binding”, “hurling” etc.) are used as necessary “material”, allegor-
ical interpretation reveals that these symbolic depictions of the immaterial reality are 
concealed from the vulgar, but available to those who have been properly educated in 
philosophy. That is why Proclus says (In rem I 85, 26–86, 1) that “such myths encourage 
those who are naturally suited to desire the wisdom hidden in them” (ἀνεγείρουσιν μὲν οἱ 
τοιοίδε μῦθοι τοὺς εὐφυεστέρους πρὸς τὴν ἔφεσιν τῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀποκρύφου θεωρίας), 
37  Sheppard (1980: 17). Cf. also Lamberton (1986: 171–173) and Struck (2004: 244).
38  Cf. e.g. Procl. In Tim. I 141, 24–25: ἡ παλαιὰ θεολογία … παρ’ ῾Ομήρῳ.
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stressing further (In rem I 86, 1–4) that the “apparent marvel-mongering” (φαινομένη 
τερατολογία) of such myths not only awakens the initiated ones to a quest for the truth 
but also keeps away the profane crowd.
From allegoresis to theurgy: δαιμόνιος τρόπος τῆς μυθοποιΐας 
That Homer’s poetry is symbolic means that it must derive its “material” from the sensi-
ble world: entheastic myths portray the transcendence of the gods anthropomorphi cally 
just as nature depicts that which is intelligible through that which is sensible (see above). 
While the highest kind of poetry is, thereby, mediated in the world of phenomena, this 
phenomenal basis of symbolic poetry brings it close to theurgy, which also employs 
the material to invoke the divine.39 Accordingly, Proclus draws an important parallel 
between the soteriological power of symbolic poetry and that of theurgic practices, as he 
compares the impact of symbols in myths with that of symbols in magic rites:
The art, therefore, governing sacred matters distributes, in a fitting way, the whole of ritual 
among the gods and the attendants of the gods (i.e., the demons), in order that none of those 
who attend the gods eternally should be left without a share in the religious service due them. 
This art calls on the gods with the holiest rites and mystic symbols, and invokes the gifts of the 
demons through the medium of a secret sympathy by means of visible passions. In the same 
way, the fathers of such myths as we have been discussing, having gazed on virtually the entire 
procession of divine reality, and being eager to connect the myths with the whole chain which 
proceeds from each god, made the surface images of their myths analogous to the lowest races of 
being which preside over lowest, material sufferings. However, what was hidden and unknown 
to the many they handed down to those whose passion it is to look upon being, in a form which 
revealed the transcendent being of the gods concealed in inaccessible places. As a consequence, 
although every myth is demonic on its surface, it is divine with respect to its secret doctrine. 
ὥσπερ οὖν ἡ τῶν ἱερῶν τέχνη κατανείμασα δεόντως τὴν σύμπασαν θρῃσκείαν τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ 
τοῖς τῶν θεῶν ὀπαδοῖς, ἵνα μηδὲν ἄμοιρον τῆς ἐπιβαλλούσης θεραπείας ἀπολείπηται τῶν 
ἀϊδίως ἑπομένων τοῖς θεοῖς, τοὺς μὲν ταῖς ἁγιωτάταις τελεταῖς καὶ τοῖς μυστικοῖς συμβόλοις 
προσάγεται, τῶν δὲ τοῖς φαινομένοις παθήμασιν προκαλεῖται τὰς δόσεις διὰ δή τινος ἀρρήτου 
συμπαθείας, οὕτως ἄρα καὶ οἱ τῶν τοιῶνδε μύθων πατέρες εἰς πᾶσαν ὡς εἰπεῖν ἀποβλέψαντες 
τὴν τῶν θείων πρόοδον καὶ τοὺς μύθους εἰς ὅλην ἀνάγειν σπεύδοντες τὴν ἀφ’ ἑκάστου 
προϊοῦσαν σειρὰν τὸ μὲν προβεβλημένον αὐτῶν καὶ εἰδωλικὸν ἀνάλογον ὑπεστήσαντο τοῖς 
ἐσχάτοις γένεσιν καὶ τῶν τελευταίων καὶ ἐνύλων προεστηκόσι παθῶν, τὸ δὲ ἀποκεκρυμμένον 
καὶ ἄγνωστον τοῖς πολλοῖς τῆς ἐν ἀβάτοις ἐξῃρημένης τῶν θεῶν οὐσίας ἐκφαντικὸν τοῖς 
39  Cf. e.g. Coulter (1976: 50–57); Cardullo (1985: 126–135); Struck (2004: 246–251 and 2010: 67–68) and 
Pichler (2006: 228–253).
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φιλοθεάμοσιν τῶν ὄντων παρέδοσαν. καὶ οὕτω δὴ τῶν μύθων ἕκαστος δαιμόνιος μέν ἐστιν 
κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον, θεῖος δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἀπόρρητον θεωρίαν.40
Symbols permeate the whole of reality.41 What divinely inspired poetry and theur-
gy have in common is that they both build on the relation of “sympathy” between 
a σύμβολον (σύνθημα) and its referent. While the term συμπάθεια stands literally for an 
“affinity” or “fellow-feeling”, in Proclus it designates a non-mimetic connection between 
a material object and an immaterial entity. Sympathy is, then, a magical power that 
connects the visible with the invisible. Hence, it is through the relationship of sympathy 
that the sacred symbols in entheastic myths and theurgic practices can bring individuals 
into the state of union with the divine.42
That is why Proclus says in the above-cited passage that mythmakers have created 
the surface images of their myths analogous to the lowest races of divine beings, i.e., 
demons. This means that entheastic myths and theurgic practices are “demonic” due to 
their phenomenal surface, but “divine” with respect to their symbolic meaning.43 Indeed, 
Proclus explicitly stresses (In rem I 86, 10–13) that the “kinship of these myths with the 
tribe of demons” (τῶν μύθων τούτων πρὸς τὸ τῶν δαιμόνων φῦλον συγγένειαν) consists 
precisely in the “activity of making symbolic revelations” (ἐνεργείας συμβολικῶς […] 
δηλούσης), upon which he further specifies that (In rem I 86, 20) “the mode of such 
myth-making is demonic” (δαιμόνιος ὁ τρόπος ἐστὶ τῆς τοιαύτης μυθοποιΐας). These 
assertions show that from Proclus’ perspective being an interpreter of entheastic myths 
is tantamount to being a mystagogue.44
Everything that has been said so far makes it easy to understand why Proclus 
ascribes to allegorical interpretation of symbolic poetry the same soteriological power 
40  Proclus In rem I 78, 18–79, 4. Translation by Coulter (1976: 55–56).
41  Brisson (1996: 142) suggestively explains that symbols are “les extrémités de séries divines qui depuis 
le haut descendent jusqu’aux derniers êtres en passant au travers de toutes les classes d’êtres qui se rencontrent 
dans le réel”. This is precisely what makes the symbols in poetry very much like the symbols in theurgy: “on ne 
perçoit plus très bien la différence entre la nature d’un objet symbolique utilisé dans des opérations théurgiques” 
(Brisson 1996: 144).
42  As Müri (1976: 34) nicely puts it: “Vermittels der heiligen Symbole (…) werden die Menschen in einen 
ganz andern Zustand versetzt; aus sich heraustretend, gehen sie ganz in Gott über”.
43  This has been aptly clarified by Cardullo (1985: 127) in the following way: “Il paragone con l’arte rituale 
e con la sua particolare natura ci fa comprendere meglio la conclusione procliana a proposito dei due aspetti 
del mito omerico: questo è appropriato ai demoni nel suo aspetto visible, e appropriato agli dei secondo la sua 
dottrina segreta”. That is why entheastic myths produce the same effect as theurgic practices: “Come, infatti, 
il rituale ieratico, in virtú delle formule simboliche e degli aspetti irrazionali di cui si avvale, acquista valore ini-
ziatico e provoca l’unione mistica con la divinità, cosí il mito omerico produce degli effetti analoghi, sopratutto 
grazie ai suoi simboli osceni e sconvenienti” (Cardullo 1985: 128). In a similar vein, Whitman (1987: 96) notes 
that symbolic myths and demons “serve preeminently as mediators to the truth”. Brisson speaks in this context 
of a “double reference” (cf. supra, n. 8).
44  In connection with the latter point, Brisson (1996: 122) rightly observes: “La tâche de l’interprète, qu’elle 
s’applique à la philosophie ou à la poésie, est assimilée à celle du mystagogue qui, dans les mystères, guide le 
postulant vers l’initiation et l’époptie”. For a very good discussion of the relationship between allegoresis and 
ethics in Proclus, see Pichler (2006: 186–240).
135Symbolic Poetry, Inspired Myths and Salvific Function of Allegoresis in Proclus’ Commentary on the Republic
that he finds in theurgic rites: studying the demonic nature of entheastic myths serves 
the purpose of knowing the divine and uniting with it. Accordingly, Proclus claims 
(In rem I 80, 10) that the symbolic (entheastic) myths “lift up” (ἀνάγουσιν) to the 
“contemplation” (θεωρία) of the gods, just as the grim and monstrous surface of these 
myths is said (In rem I 85, 16–26) to “compel” (ἀναγκάζειν) the listeners to “contemplate” 
(θεωρεῖν) what divinities the mythmakers have hidden in these symbolic myths. 
In Proclus, allegoresis receives a religious justification, as it paves the way for authen-
tic piety and genuine religiousness.45 Without the aid of allegorical interpretation, Plato’s 
criticism of Homer is valid, since the myths of Homer (and other poets) are doomed 
to primitive and immoral anthropomorphism. Yet, studying meticulously the demonic 
surface of various shocking and outrageous myths leads individuals to a genuinely sacred 
reality, as they are “lifted” and “compelled” to allegorically search for the true divini-
ty concealed underneath these crude portrayals of deities. Thus, allegoresis transforms 
Homer’s mythology from superstition and/or blasphemy to a profound religious experi-
ence. The soteriological power of allegoresis consists, thereby, in that it brings the initi-
ated readers closer to the gods through revealing the true nature of the divinity hidden 
underneath the demonic: allegorical interpretation of entheastic myths makes union with 
the gods possible, for it makes us aware of the sympathy between these symbolic myths 
and their referents. In this way, allegoresis enables us to truly participate in the divine.
Final remarks  
When trying to mediate in the ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry, Proclus 
argues that it is only on the surface that Homer has “attributed to the gods all sorts of 
things which are matters of reproach and censure (ὀνείδεα καὶ ψόγος) among men”.46 
According to Proclus, the truce between philosophers and poets can easily be achieved 
when it is understood that the highest kind of poetry needs to be read symbolically and 
not mimetically: if the poet’s portrayals of the gods seem prima facie impious to the point 
of blasphemy, then allegoresis shows that these anthropomorphic depictions must be 
recognized as indispensable tools for communicating the divine. While symbols are the 
only vehicle for conveying the immaterial, they do not imitate the things they denote. 
Proclus insists that entheastic myths seek to do justice to the indescribable and inexpress-
ible nature of the divine as accurately as humanly possible, i.e., symbolically. Thus, rather 
than being sacrilegious and irreverent, such myths illustrate that the immaterial can only 
be reached via the material. 
45  The same can be said of the Stoics’ etymologizing, cf. Domaradzki (2012: 143–147).
46  DK 21 B 11. Translation by Lesher (1992: 23).
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Symbolic Poetry, Inspired Myths and Salvific Function of Allegoresis 
in Proclus’ Commentary on the Republic
The present article is concerned with Proclus’ highly original and 
profoundly influential account of the symbolic function of poetry, the 
pedagogic as well as the hieratic value of myths and the soteriological 
power of allegorical interpretation. Thus, the paper begins with a brief 
discussion of Plato’s dismissal of poetry as μέγιστον ψεῦδος. Subse-
quently, Proclus’ theory of three kinds of poetry is examined, upon 
which attention is paid to his revolutionary idea that σύμβολα rather 
than μιμήματα are the tools of the highest kind of poetry. Then, Proclus’ 
views on the difference between Plato’s and Homer’s μυθοποιΐα are 
considered. While the article concludes with an analysis of Proclus’ 
conviction about the functional similarity of symbols in myths and those 
in magic rites, allegoresis is shown to have the same salvational role that 
Proclus ascribes to theurgy.
Proclus, Homer, Plato, poetry, imitation, symbol, myth, allegoresis, 
theurgy
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